This paper reviews the inflation experience in the post-Bretton Woods era in the context of alternative central bank objectives. It summarizes research on inflation-targeting issues, especially those associated with stabilizing the price level. Generally, inflationtargeting schemes do not provide a nominal anchor unless the central bank is focusing strictly on the inflation target and ignoring unemployment and the business cycle.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Czech Republic and other economies in transition are facing the same problem that Western democracies faced in 1973 when the international monetary system based on a modified gold standard collapsed. These countries are now learning how to develop and maintain an efficient paper money standard, to find a way to anchor the purchasing power of their currency. When the Bretton Woods System came apart, the The best option for a small open economy like the Czech Republic may be to tie its monetary policy to a larger trading partner. Certainly, the idea of fixing the Czech koruna to the European euro is one possibility. But exchange rate rules are not considered here. Rather, this article examines issues that arise when a country adopts an independent monetary policy. Using a common framework, the article compares actual outcomes to those that might be expected under alternative assumptions about central bank objectives.
Section II reviews the inflation experience in the post-Bretton Woods era.
Section III summarizes our research on issues in inflation targeting, especially those associated with stabilizing the price level.
1 Section IV investigates the improvement in price stability that can be achieved by adding a long-term price-level objective to an inflation-targeting regime. Section V presents results from our model calibrated to time series data for selected countries and periods. Section VI concludes.
II. THE INFLATION EXPERIENCE IN SELECTED COUNTRIES
Since the end of Bretton Woods, most discussion about price stability has been in terms of inflation, not the price level. Figure 1a shows the inflation rates for five countries are key currency countries or had relatively high inflation after March 1973.
As Figure 1a shows, inflation rates were relatively low and close together before Bretton Woods ended. By March 1973, all of the countries, except Germany, began to experience higher and more variable inflation. While there were a variety of monetary policy experiments in these countries, all adopted some form of monetary targeting. Of these five, only Germany continues to advocate monetary targeting as a framework for achieving and maintaining price stability. (Interestingly, Bernanke et al. (1999) , who advocate inflation targeting, list Germany as a country that implicitly targets inflation even though it announces targets for the monetary aggregate, M3, and has never adopted short-run targets for inflation. Also, describe German policy more as an inflation-targeting regime than as a monetary targeting policy.)
Monetary targeting was most prevalent from 1973 through 1985, the period when inflation was highest and most volatile. While common behavioral patterns are evident in Figure 1a , the country detail is not. Figures 1b through 1e show the inflation rates of Japan, the United States, the United Kingdom and Italy in combination with the inflation rate for Germany, which had the lowest inflation rate for the full 40-year period.
The countries are ordered by their success in getting control over inflation.
Although Japan and the United States had the same average inflation throughout the 40-year period, Japan is placed first because Japanese monetary authorities were several years ahead of the United States in getting control over the inflation. Initially, Japan reacted to the quadrupling of the world oil price in 1973 by allowing the inflation rate to soar above 20 percent per year. Japanese inflation remained in double digits throughout 1973 and 1974 . By 1977 , inflation began to come down. Since 1980, Japan's average inflation rate has been lower than Germany's (see Figure 1b) .
The U.S. government adopted wage and price controls in conjunction with an expansionary monetary policy in the early 1970s. In 1973, inflationary pressures associated with rising world oil prices brought an end to price controls and a rapid acceleration of inflation (see Figure 1c ). Monetarists in academia and at the St. Louis
Federal Reserve Bank argued for stricter monetary targeting-keeping money growth closer to the target in the short run and achieving the average target growth rate over a longer horizon (eliminating the year-end drift in the base of the target). Such stricter monetary targeting implied less emphasis on keeping output at its full-employment potential and smoothing short-term interest rates. New procedures were adopted that set weekly targets for a monetary reserve aggregate rather than an interest rate. The policy led to high and volatile ex post real interest rates, but no significant decline in monetary growth. Despite the failure of monetary aggregates to slow, inflation (as measured by the CPI) fell sharply from a 15 percent annual rate in the first quarter of 1980 to less than 2 percent in the last quarter of 1982.
The pattern of inflation in the United Kingdom was much the same as in the United States, but the average rate was somewhat higher (see Figure 1d ). In Italy, the CPI inflation rate remained in double digits until 1985 (see Figure 1e ). By then, all five countries appear to have gained more control over inflation. The period following 1984 appears to be one of relatively stable inflation, more like the period under the Bretton Woods Agreement.
The unweighted average CPI inflation rate in these five countries for this 40-year period was 5.4 percent, and the standard deviation of quarterly inflation was 5.1 percent at an annual rate. In the period following the breakdown of the Bretton Woods agreement, average inflation rose to 9.8 percent and the average standard deviation rose one-half percentage point to 5.6 percent. Since the end of 1984, the average inflation rate has dropped dramatically to 3.3 percent, somewhat below the average during the period of Bretton Woods. The average standard deviation of inflation also has been much lower at 2.6 percent.
The inflation rates shown in Figure 1a were associated with widely varying behavior of price levels. Figure 2 shows the Consumer Price Index (CPI), normalized to one in January 1957, for each of our five countries. Italy had the highest average inflation (7.8 percent at an annual rate) throughout the last 40 years, more than 2 percentage points above the average. The lowest average inflation was in Germany where the inflation rate averaged 3.2 percent during the full period, more than 2 percentage points below the average. The broad range of experience in Figure 2 is shown to provide a benchmark for considering the magnitude of uncertainty about the price level implied by alternative monetary policy regimes.
III. INFLATION TARGETING AND PRICE-LEVEL STABILITY
Would a price-level objective destabilize the economy? The idea of inflation targeting is appealing both to those who think that having a target for inflation focuses policymakers' attention on the inflation objective, as well as to those who want rule-like policy, but believe that the central bank can still achieve multiple objectives. The problem with inflation targeting is that it does not tie down the price level. It does not provide a nominal anchor. If a nominal anchor is the goal, why not target the price level directly? Fisher (1994) , Cecchetti (1998) and Kiley (1998) offer intuitive explanationsbased on analysis of a single price shock-about why attempting to achieve a price-level objective would increase the variability of inflation and output. Milton Friedman (1968) made perhaps the most influential objection to price-level targeting in his December 1967 presidential address to the American Economic Association. In recommending how monetary policy should be conducted, he explains why he would not target a price level:
"Of the three guides listed, the price level is clearly the most important in its own right. Other things the same, it would be much the best of the alternatives-as so many distinguished economists have urged in the past. But other things are not the same. The link between the policy actions of the authority and the price level, while unquestionably present, is more indirect than the link between the policy actions of the authority and any of the several monetary totals. Moreover, monetary action takes a longer time to affect the price level than to affect the monetary totals and both the time lag and the magnitude of the effect vary with circumstances. As a result, we cannot predict at all accurately just what effect a particular monetary action will have on the price level and, equally important, just when it will have that effect. Attempting to control directly the price level is therefore likely to make monetary policy itself a source of economic disturbance because of false stops and starts. Perhaps, as our understanding of monetary phenomena advances, the situation will change. But at the present state of our understanding, the long way around seems the surer way to our objective. Accordingly, I believe that a monetary total is the best currently available immediate guide or criterion for monetary policy-and I believe that it matters much less which particular total is chosen than that one be chosen." (Page 15) This was written before the Rational Expectations revolution had taken hold. Our understanding of monetary phenomena has advanced since then. We now know that the immediate effect of a monetary policy action on anything will vary with circumstances.
The way to evaluate policy strategies is not to look at the effect of a single action, but rather to examine the implications of alternative rules in dynamic model economies.
This section summarizes research that uses a dynamic framework popularized by Lars Svensson (1997 Svensson ( , 1999 . Svensson (1999) showed that, for the case with a Neoclassical aggregate supply function and a persistent output gap, a price-level targeting regime would result in less short-run inflation variability than an inflation targeting regime. Using a simplified version of Svensson's model, Dittmar et al. (1999a) The introduction of a lagged output gap in this equation is important in comparing inflation and price-level targeting. Conceptually, the lag will be introduced any time some friction prevents instantaneous and complete adjustment of output to unexpected changes in the price level. This friction could be induced by incomplete information, wage contracts, menu costs, transaction costs, incomplete markets, capital adjustment costs, etc. Dittmar and Gavin (1999) show that the introduction of lagged output tends to make the Neoclassical aggregate supply function look more like the New Keynesian supply functions described in Roberts (1995) . implying the following rule for the inflation rate:
The price-level target, p t * , is given by p t * = p * + p t-1 * . With the price-level target, the central bank's reaction function (6) has three elements on the right-hand side. The first is the steady-state inflation embodied in the target path for the price level. The second and third are proportional, countercyclical adjustments to the change in the output gap from period t-2 to period t-1 and the change in the technology shock from period t-1 to period t, respectively.
As Svensson (1999) explains, the relative variance of inflation under inflation and price-level targeting rules depends on whether the output gap itself is more or less variable than its rate of change. If the output gap is highly persistent (r >0.5), the output gap itself will be more variable than its rate of change and the inflation rate will be more variable under an inflation-targeting regime. The answer to the question opening this section is no, stabilizing the price level should not destabilize short-run inflation or the real economy. In the commonly used aggregate supply framework, the price-level target actually results in less short-run volatility, not more. The better performance expected under price-level targeting can be seen in the Taylor curves for inflation and price-level targeting in Figure 3 . There we used the Neoclassical aggregate supply function with r calibrated to persistence in the different countries (always greater than 0.5). We return to this figure in Section V. Kiley (1998) objected to the use of the Neoclassical aggregate supply curve and suggested that one based on New Keynesian theories would be more realistic and less likely to favor the price-level target. Dittmar and Gavin (1999) In the computational experiments, r was set equal to 0.9 and a equal to 0.5.
We assume that the interest rate is 4 percent at an annual rate, so the quarterly discount factor is approximately 0.99. The standard deviation of the random error in the aggregate supply function (2) is assumed to be 0.75 percent at a quarterly rate. The two most important parameters in this model are the degree of persistence in the output gap, r, and the central bank's relative preference for output stabilization, l. The values for r and the standard deviation of the random error in the aggregate supply function are chosen to approximate estimates for the U.S. economy.
The experiment is run here using four alternative values of l: 0.5, 0.33, 0.25, and 0.1. 6 The upper panel in Table 1 reports standard errors for deviations of the average inflation rates from the central bank's target. The model was run for 160 periods (corresponding to quarters). There were 100 replications in each experiment. Each experiment was started with the same random number seed, so that the same series of random errors was used in each column of the table. There were 100 prices saved for each period. Trimming 16-2/3 percent off each tail of the distribution of prices in each period produced the data in the table. Because the samples were relatively small, the distributions were not perfectly symmetric. The standard deviations reported are the averages of the absolute deviations associated with the upper and lower tails. The average inflation rates were calculated from the beginning to the reported horizon. The standard deviation of the price level from its expected path for the reported horizons is shown in the bottom panel of Table 1 .
The two most important results are: 1) inflation targeting does not pin down the price level, and 2) the weight the central bank puts on output stabilization really matters.
With l = 0.5, the standard deviation of the inflation rate is 3.2 percent at a five year horizon. If the central bank targets inflation at 2 percent, we would expect the actual five-year-ahead inflation rate to be greater than 5 percent or less than -1 percent one-third of the time. In calculating the inflation risk associated with a 20-year investment, we would expect the average inflation rate to be greater than 4 percent or less than zero Dittmar et al. (1999b) also show that if central banks want to both stabilize business cycle fluctuations and achieve price stability, they may find it useful to adopt a long-term objective for the price level. One way to do this is to follow Black, Macklem, and Rose (1997) and write down an inflation-targeting rule with an error-correction term for the deviation of the actual price level from the long-term path implied by the inflation target. Another way is to suppose that there is a policymaking committee that includes a mixture of policymaker types, A and B. Type A policymaker's loss function is given by countries and conclude that it is often found to be around 0.33. Table 2 presents the results of running the inflation-targeting experiment for our combination rule. Here, we assumed the value of 1/3 for the central bank's preference parameter, l. The first column of Table 2 merely repeats the second column of Table 1, where there was no price-level targeting involved. Here the 20-year-ahead inflation rate had a standard deviation of 1.6 percent around the target. Putting just a small, 0.01, weight on the price-level deviation reduces the standard deviations by 25 percent.
IV. MONETARY POLICY WITH A PRICE-LEVEL OBJECTIVE
Putting one-tenth of the weight on the price-level deviations reduces the standard deviations by 75 percent. As the table shows, even when the error-correction parameter is as large as 0.1, the uncertainty about the price level at relevant horizons is still almost twice as great as McCallum's random-walk example.
V. MONETARY POLICY IN SELECTED COUNTRIES
In this section, we compute the Taylor In this section, we simply assume that the aggregate supply parameter, a, is equal to 0.5.
The value of the coefficient on expected inflation in the velocity function, q, is assumed to equal 0.4. Dittmar and Gavin (2000) show that the results are not sensitive to a reasonable range of values for a and q. Also, the location of the Taylor Curves for monetary targeting were relatively insensitive to assumptions about the amount of persistence in the velocity error.
The output gap was calculated by regressing the logarithm of real GDP for each of the five countries on a quadratic time trend. The standard deviations of the output gap and inflation are reported for each period in the bottom panel of Table 3 . They are also shown as points in each of the panels of Figure 3 , which shows the Taylor Curves for the individual countries. The quarterly standard deviation of inflation here is based on the change in the logarithm of the GDP deflator (Table 1 reports CPI statistics).
The policy model developed above is calibrated to the five countries: Germany, Japan, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Italy. We estimate values for the first- The properties of the distribution for this estimate were discussed in Dickey and Fuller (1981) . The equations used to estimate the autocorrelation parameters also yield estimates of the variance of output shock for each country. The standard error of the output shock used in the calibrations is calculated as the standard deviation of the sum of two last terms in the equation,
This was done because cyclical components in output are not adequately captured by our simple model.
The post-Bretton Woods period is split in two parts, 1973:Q2 to 1984:Q4 and 1985:Q1 to 1998:Q4. In the earlier period policy seemed to be more erratic with rising inflation in all countries but Germany. In the latter period, these countries all found a way to stabilize inflation. Table 3 shows the estimates of the autoregressive parameters calculated for the output gap for each period. The table also reports the statistics used to calibrate the models that generate the Taylor Curves in Figure 3 .
For Germany, only the first-period results are reported because the data available did not adequately adjust for the effect of the unification on GDP and the monetary aggregates. The values used to calibrate the Taylor Curves for Germany (see first panel in Figure 3 ) are shown in the first column of Table 3 . The standard deviation of the output shock was in the low end, equal to Italy's and somewhat greater than Japan's, but less than estimates for the United States and United Kingdom. However, the estimate of the persistence in the output gap was the lowest for all countries in either period. Since we are using Svensson's Neoclassical supply function, the relatively low persistence of the output gap means that the Taylor Curve for price-level targeting is not so far below the one for inflation targeting. The location of the actual value of the output variance, 2.3 percent, is above the highest value suggested by the Taylor Curves generated from inflation-targeting and price-level targeting regimes.
Japan is a very interesting case because it is the only one in which the Taylor Curves shift rightward in the second period. The scales in the panels of Figure 3 are all the same so that the curves can be more easily compared. Note, however, that the comparisons across time for each country are more relevant than the comparisons between countries.
The reason is simply that measurement methods may be so different that cross-country comparisons are suspect. In the Japan's case, the standard deviation of the output shock is only slightly lower in the second period, while the persistence of the output gap is much closer to unity.
In the United States, the standard deviation of the output gap declined by about two-thirds from the earlier to the latter period. Although there was a substantial increase in the persistence, there was still a large downward (leftward) shift in the Taylor Curves in the second period. The Taylor Curves for the United Kingdom in the earlier period look similar to the curves for Japan in the second period. In the United Kingdom, the standard deviations of both shocks fell by about half, and there was little change in the autocorrelation estimate for output. Italy is an interesting case because it has a relatively low standard deviation of the shock to the output gap, but has the highest persistence, so the Taylor Curves are not much different than those for the United Kingdom. The big leftward shift in the United Kingdom was associated with a lower error variance, while in Italy, it was a combination of a lower variance and a lower estimate of the persistence in output.
One common aspect of all of our countries is that the inflation variances are all smaller in the second period, even in Japan, where the output variance is 50 percent larger than in the earlier period. In almost every case (the exceptions are Japan and Italy in the earlier period), the actual values for the standard deviations of the output gap lie above the maximum value for the standard deviation of output found on the Taylor Curves for inflation and price-level targeting. One explanation for this is that the model is too optimistic about the central bank's ability to control output. Perhaps the output variance is given by nature (or some other aspect of economic policy), and all monetary policymakers can do is stabilize the inflation rate. Indeed, some analysts have argued that the main service provided by explicit inflation targeting is to give central banks the political cover to ignore the output gap. The Taylor Curves shown in Figure 3 were calculated from pure policies. In future work, we intend to consider combination policies like those considered in the previous section.
VI. CONCLUSION
Our research shows that commonly proposed rules for targeting inflation generate an enormous amount of uncertainty over the long run. Inflation-targeting schemes do not provide a nominal anchor unless the central bank is focusing strictly on the inflation target and ignoring unemployment and the business cycle. Inflation has been unexpectedly stable in the 1990s. This may be partly because central banks have used inflation targeting as cover to ignore the real side. But, with the exception of Japan, it is also true that output fluctuations in these countries have been smaller in the 1990s than they were on average for most of the last half century.
The international monetary arrangements agreed to at Bretton Woods in 1946 reflected policymakers' confidence that they could build a system of fiat money standards that would provide price stability. For a variety of reasons, the system failed. The most important lesson that the Czech Republic, and all of us, can take from this experience is to focus on the inflation objective. Central banks focusing more sharply on inflation objectives have delivered lower and more stable inflation.
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